Abstract: Church's thesis asserts that a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. A related thesis asserts that Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of numerical computability. I endorse Church's thesis, but I argue against the related thesis. I argue that purported conceptual analyses based upon Turing's work involve a subtle but persistent circularity. Turing machines manipulate syntactic entities. To specify which number-theoretic function a Turing machine computes, we must correlate these syntactic entities with numbers. I argue that, in providing this correlation, we must demand that the correlation itself be computable. Otherwise, the Turing machine will compute uncomputable functions. But if we presuppose the intuitive notion of a computable relation between syntactic entities and numbers, then our analysis of computability is circular.
More formally, let us define a semantics for a set of symbols as a bijective mapping d from the symbols to the natural numbers. We say that Turing machine M computes numbertheoretic function f relative to semantics d just in case the Turing machine computes a stringtheoretic function ϕ such that:
We say that a number-theoretic function is Turing-computable relative to semantics d just in case some Turing machine computes it relative to d.
These definitions reflect a relativity inherent to Turing-computability. The superficially two-place relation "Turing machine M computes number-theoretic function f" disguises a suppressed parameter. It results from holding fixed one element in a three-place relation: "Turing machine M computes number-theoretic function f relative to semantics d." When we hold parameter d constant, we obtain a two-place relation between Turing machines and numbertheoretic functions. But the two-place relation instantiates a more general three-place relation.
There exist uncountably many correlations between numbers and syntactic strings. As we will see in §2, many of these correlations seem highly anomalous. In § §3-4, I investigate how the anomalous correlations bear upon Church's thesis. In §5, I argue that, by distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable correlations, we inject a persistent circularity into our analysis of computability. §2. Semantics and Turing-computability In the previous section, we considered three possible correlations between numbers and strings of strokes: d 1 , d 2 , and d 3 . The same number-theoretic functions are Turing-computable relative to each of these correlations. In this sense, d 1 , d 2 , and d 3 are computationally equivalent.
They demarcate the same privileged class of number-theoretic functions. Following standard usage, I call these privileged functions "recursive." (Note that here I follow the common practice of using the term "recursive" in connection with Turing's formalism for analyzing computability.
Soare [25] criticizes this practice. As Soare argues, the term "recursive" was initially introduced in connection with the equation calculus. Only later did "recursive" come to mean something like "Turing-computable relative to d 1 ." The two concepts are extensionally equivalent, but they are intensionally distinct. Soare argues that we should return to the original usage, which was strongly favored by both Turing and Gödel. While I share Soare's concerns, I will follow current standard usage. In general, these intensional distinctions will not affect my discussion, although they become fleetingly relevant near the end of §3.)
If we employ a semantics sufficiently different from d 1 -d 3 , then various non-recursive functions become Turing-computable. Suppose X is an infinite, co-infinite subset of the natural numbers. Enumerate the elements of X and N \ X in ascending order as follows: X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , …} and N \ X = {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , …}. Define semantics d X by: d X (n) = x n/2 , if n is even d X (n) = y (n-1)/2 , if n is odd.
We can then program a Turing machine that computes the characteristic function of X, relative to d X . The Turing machine proceeds as follows: when supplied with a string of n strokes, the machine examines whether n is even or odd; if n is even then the machine outputs d X -1 (0); if n is odd, then the machine outputs d X -1 (1) . This technique applies to any infinite, co-infinite set X, whether or not X possesses a recursive characteristic function.
Say that a semantics is uniform if it assigns the same number to each string n when n appears as an input and when n appears as an output. It is easy to show that every number-theoretic function is Turing-computable relative to some non-uniform semantics. However, there exist number-theoretic functions that are not
Turing-computable relative to any uniform semantics. For an example of such a function, see
Shapiro [20] . 1 Shapiro's example generalizes, yielding the following result: there exist uncountably many number-theoretic functions that are not Turing-computable relative to any uniform semantics. Hence, the functions Turing-computable relative to some uniform semantics comprise a substantial but highly non-exhaustive subset of the number-theoretic functions.
To simplify matters, I henceforth restrict myself to uniform semantic relations. In what follows, "semantics" means "uniform semantics." §3. A difficulty surrounding Church's thesis
Intuitively speaking, a function is "computable" just in case there exists a mechanical
procedure for determining what value the function attains on a given input. According to Church's thesis, a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. 2 I will not discuss the right-to-left direction of Church's thesis, except to note that, like most commentators, I find it relatively evident. Traditionally, the left-to-right direction has been viewed as much more problematic. I now want to explore an apparent difficulty surrounding it.
In §4, I will try to resolve the difficulty. 3 Let X consist of the Gödel numbers of sentences provable in Peano Arithmetic, under some fixed Gödel-numbering. Let f X be the characteristic function of X. In the previous section,
we constructed a semantics d X such that f X is Turing-computable relative to d X . Imagine, then, a philosopher who reasons as follows:
If Peano Arithmetic is consistent, then f X is not recursive. But that does not show that f X is uncomputable. On the contrary, it shows that Church's thesis enshrines an overly restrictive conception of computability. We must expand our conception, supplementing meager semantic (a) The behavior of a computor is determined uniquely at any moment by two factors: (1) the symbols or symbolic configurations he observes, and (2) his "state of mind" or "internal state."
There is a fixed finite number of symbolic configurations a computor can immediately recognize.
(c) There is a fixed finite number of states of mind that need to be taken into account.
(d) Only elements of observed symbolic configurations can be changed.
(e) The distribution of observed squares can be changed, but each of the new observed squares must be within a bounded distance L of an immediately previously observed square. 4 According to Turing, constraints (a)-(e) govern the mechanical activity of any human computing agent. Turing motivates these constraints by citing various limits upon our perceptual and cognitive apparatus. 5 Turing then presents a key result, which Sieg labels Turing's theorem and formulates as follows: "Any number-theoretic function f that can be computed by a computor, satisfying… Second, Turing's analysis concerns human mechanical activity, not human cognition in general. As Gödel puts it, "the question of whether there exist finite non-mechanical procedures, not equivalent with any algorithm, has nothing whatsoever to do with the adequacy of the definition of… 'mechanical procedure'" ( [10] , p. 370). Constraints (a)-(e) do not purport to govern all possible processes for determining some function's value. Imagine a computor who possesses a mysterious cognitive faculty, which enables him to determine some uncomputable function's value upon any input. When presented with an input, the computor "just knows" the correct answer. Constraints (a)-(e) do not deny the existence of this mysterious cognitive faculty.
They merely deny that someone who deploys the faculty thereby computes a number-theoretic function. By employing the faculty, the computor introduces an essentially non-mechanical element into his mathematical activity. He implements a non-algorithmic cognitive strategy. We cannot deny a priori that such cognitive strategies exist. But we can expunge them from our account of computation. That is precisely what (a)-(e) seek to accomplish.
Given these caveats, how convincing is Turing's argument? I find certain aspects of it puzzling. For instance, constraints (a) and (c) include the rather ill-defined phrase "state of mind." What are these states of mind, and why should we assume that only finitely many of them are relevant to a given computation? 7 I also harbor some worries about "Turing's theorem,"
which asserts that any function computable within constraints (a)-(e) is computable by a Turing machine. Turing's defense of this "theorem" is so elliptical that I find it difficult to understand. 8 I set such worries aside. Even if they prove surmountable, a more serious worry remains.
As I will now argue, Turing's argument exhibits a crucial lacuna. At best, Turing establishes that every intuitively computable function is Turing-computable relative to some semantics, not that every intuitively computable function is Turing-computable relative to semantics d 1 .
Turing adduces constraints upon mechanical manipulation of syntactic items. Constraint (a) demands that computational processes be somehow deterministic. Constraints (b) and (c) mandate that the perceptual and cognitive capacities deployed during computation be finitely limited. Constraints (d) and (e) impose spatial bounds upon the computor's ability to observe and adjust symbols. All five constraints concern how the computor manipulates symbolic representations for numbers. They do not address how symbolic representations and numbers relate to one another. They therefore provide no basis for commending certain semantic relations over others. In particular, they do not favor d 1 over d X .
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Consider the following scenario: a computor manipulates symbols that possess semantics This question deserves a principled answer, one which yields an invidious distinction between the anodyne d 1 and the deviant d X .
In the next section, I address the semantic relation between symbols and numbers, and I present an emended argument for Church's thesis. The notion computable semantics is the key ingredient missing from Turing's account.
By embracing it, we can construct an improved argument for Church's thesis. In presenting this argument, I presuppose "Turing's theorem": I assume that Turing machines can replicate all mechanical symbolic manipulation implemented by humans. In other words, I assume that all intuitively computable string-theoretic functions are Turing-computable. Due to this assumption, my argument faces many obstacles that face Turing's. For instance, any worries regarding
Turing's locution "state of mind" also infect my argument. I continue to set such worries aside.
My argument for Church's thesis invokes two intuitive principles:
The composition of two computable functions is computable.
The inverse of a bijective computable function is computable.
The first principle, which says that the computable functions are closed under composition, applies to all computable functions. (Informal proof: given an algorithm for computing f and an algorithm for computing g, compute f(g(x)) by applying the second algorithm to x and then applying the first algorithm to the result.) The second principle applies to those computable functions defined over domains whose elements one can mechanically enumerate. (Informal proof: given a computable function f, and given y, here is an algorithm for computing f -1 (y):
enumerate the elements of the domain, computing the value that f attains on each element in the enumeration, until encountering an element x such that f(x) = y; take x to be f -1 (y).)
One might worry about the assumption, which underlies our second intuitive principle, that one can mechanically enumerate the elements of the relevant domains. Don't we need
Church's thesis in order to say which domains conform to the assumption? And, if so, won't an argument for Church's thesis based upon that assumption beg the question? 13 I respond that, although we may require Church's thesis to offer a general, precise characterization of the domains whose elements we can mechanically enumerate, we do not require Church's thesis to recognize certain specific examples of mechanically enumerable domains. Similarly, although we may require Church's thesis to characterize which numbertheoretic functions are intuitively computable, we do not require Church's thesis to recognize that certain particular functions are intuitively computable. We intuitively recognize that the natural numbers are mechanically enumerable, via the successor function, and that the stroke language is mechanically enumerable, via adjunction by an additional stroke. This recognition does not depend upon Church's thesis. In general, all the domains relevant to this paper are intuitively recognizable as mechanically enumerable, without reliance upon Church's thesis. (I will henceforth ignore the assumption of mechanical enumerability, somewhat sloppily describing the computable functions as being closed under inverses.)
Given our two intuitive principles, we can easily establish Church's thesis. Suppose f is an intuitively computable numerical function.
and hence that ϕ is a string-theoretic function that computes f relative to d 1 . Consider again the scenario described by Turing: an idealized human computor manipulates symbols inscribed on paper. The computor manipulates these symbols because he wants to calculate the value some number-theoretic function assumes on some input. The computor starts with a symbolic representation for the input, performs a series of syntactic operations, and arrives at a symbolic representation for the output. This procedure succeeds only when the computor can understand the symbolic representations he manipulates. The computor need not know in advance which number a given symbol represents, but he must be capable, in principle, of determining which number the symbol represents. Only then does his syntactic activity constitute a computation of the relevant number-theoretic function. If the computor lacks any potential understanding of the relevant syntactic items, then his activity counts as mere manipulation of syntax, rather than calculation of one number from another.
These reflections suggest an important new constraint upon Turing's computor, to supplement Turing's original constraints (a)-(e):
The Computability Constraint: The symbols that the computor manipulates bear a computable semantic relation to the numbers they denote.
If the computor manipulates syntactic items that possess a non-computable semantics, then he cannot mechanically determine which number a given symbol denotes. He cannot understand the symbols through purely algorithmic means. But then he cannot calculate which numerical value the desired function assumes on a given input.
I must emphasize that, like Turing's constraints (a)-(e), the Computability Constraint concerns human mechanical activity. Suppose that our computor possesses a mysterious cognitive faculty that enables him to understand uncomputable notations. When confronted with symbolic representations for the natural numbers, the computor "just knows"
which number a given symbolic representation denotes. The Computability Constraint does not deny that such a faculty exists. It merely denies that someone who exploits the faculty thereby computes a number-theoretic function. Someone who employs the mysterious faculty introduces an essentially non-mechanical element into his mathematical activity. He understands the symbols he manipulates, but he understands them in an irreducibly non-mechanical way. He implements a non-algorithmic cognitive strategy. We cannot deny a priori that such cognitive strategies exist. But we can expunge them from our account of computation.
The Computability Constraint provides a straightforward diagnosis for why semantics d X seems deviant. Suppose that X is a non-recursive set. If d X were computable, it would follow that f X , the characteristic function of X, was computable. By Church's thesis, it would follow that f X was recursive. But f X is not recursive. The analysis is extensionally adequate.
The analysis is non-circular, i.e. it does not employ the concept being analyzed.
The analysis "captures the meaning" of the original concept.
The third desideratum is the most problematic, since what it is to "capture the meaning" of a concept remains quite unclear. Nevertheless, something along these lines seems integral to analyzing a concept, as opposed to offering necessary and sufficient conditions. I will argue that My criticisms echo an enigmatic passage from Emil Post's posthumously published [17] :
"Finite operations illuminated as generated by three principles (1) Symbolic 'manipulation' (2) Symbolization (3) Iteration" (p. 426). 19 Turing focuses exclusively upon factors (1) and (3): To furnish the requisite analysis, we might invoke the Computability Constraint. In other words, we might offer the following characterization of number-theoretic computability:
computable in accord with (a)-(e) relative to some computable semantics. This characterization is extensionally adequate. Moreover, unlike our earlier efforts, it reflects general constraints upon any possible number-theoretic computation. The problem is that it also seems blatantly circular, because it presupposes the intuitive notion of computability. Admittedly, it presupposes the concept computable function from symbols to numbers, not the slightly different concept computable function from numbers to number. Such a minor discrepancy hardly dispels the circularity. By adopting the proposed account, we replace mechanical procedure for computing one number from another with mechanical procedure for computing a number from a symbol.
We leave unanalyzed what it is to calculate a number from an input. We thereby abandon all pretensions towards reductive analysis.
We face a dilemma. If we characterize number-theoretic computability by invoking some fixed computable semantics, our account does not analyze mechanical procedure for computing a number-theoretic function and hence does not achieve synonymy with the target concept. Yet when we fix this problem by invoking the notion computable semantics, we inject a blatant circularity into our account. How can we isolate an extensionally adequate characterization that is both non-circular and synonymous with the original concept? Lacking a satisfactory answer to this question, we must conclude that syntactic accounts like Turing's fail to analyze numerical computation in more primitive terms. Undoubtedly, Turing's discussion profoundly illuminates computability. But illuminating a concept is not the same as analyzing it.
My argument draws an invidious distinction between string-theoretic and numbertheoretic computability. But it might seem that the distinction is spurious. Don't my worries about number-theoretic computation arise just as readily at the level of string-theoretic computation? To characterize a given physical activity as computing a string-theoretic function,
we must "encode" the strings as physical states. And won't the problem of deviant encodings arise here as well, forcing us to invoke intuitively computable correlations between physical states and strings?
No. The reason is that strings are fundamentally different entities than numbers.
In the terminology introduced by Charles Parsons [15] , syntactic entities are quasiconcrete. They are abstract, in that they are not located in space or time, but they bear intrinsic relations to privileged concrete embodiments. For example, a string of n strokes, viewed as a type, is an abstract entity, but its tokens are concrete physical inscriptions. The relation between the string and its tokens is constitutive of the string's identity. In contrast, numbers are pure abstract entities. They do not bear intrinsic relations to concrete embodiments. In particular, they do not bear intrinsic relations to either syntactic-tokens or syntactic-types. The basic insight here goes back to Frege [5] , who observed that "[o]ne could imagine the introduction some day of quite new numerals, just as, e.g., the Arabic numerals superseded the Roman. Nobody is seriously going to suppose that in this way we should get quite new numbers, quite new arithmetical objects, with properties still to be investigated." Frege concluded from this observation that "we must distinguish between numerals and their Bedeutungen" (p. 132).
Frege's observation actually supports a somewhat more general conclusion: the individuation of the numbers is not tied to particular symbolic representations. If it were, then a change in symbolic representations would entail a change in the numbers, which it does not. 20 This asymmetry between strings and numbers explains why my argument applies to numerical computability but not to string-theoretic computability. A canonical correlation between string-types and concrete inscriptions is built into the identity of the string-types. For instance, the type "string of n strokes" is canonically associated with concrete inscriptions featuring n adjacent strokes, because it is partially individuated by the fact that such inscriptions are its tokens. We need not worry about disbarring deviant encodings of strings as physical states, for the individuation of the strings enshrines a single privileged encoding. No canonical correlation between numbers and syntactic-types or syntactic-tokens is built into the individuation of numbers. This naturally raises the question of which correlations are admissible for computation. We have seen no way to answer this question without engendering circularity.
Perhaps a non-circular analysis of numerical computability exists. But I want to advertise my inability to locate one. In this vein, I will survey various obvious but unsuccessful maneuvers through which one might attempt to eliminate the circularity.
The most obvious maneuver would be to adopt the following analysis:
computable in accord with constraints (a)-(e) relative to every semantics.
However, as Shapiro [20] proves, the only functions that satisfy this condition are those differing from constant functions or the identity function on at most a finite number of arguments. Thus, the proposed maneuver is clearly inadequate.
Another obvious maneuver would be to "go meta-linguistic." We can introduce symbols that denote other symbols; the expression "n", denoting a string of n strokes, is an example. We can then formulate string-theoretic mechanical procedures that compute symbols from meta- A third obvious maneuver would be to invoke the isomorphism between the Dedekind structure of the notation system and the Dedekind structure of the natural numbers. To take a specific example, consider again the stroke language. We can view this language as an ω-sequence, with adjunction by an additional stroke serving as the successor operation. Then there exists a unique isomorphism between the stroke language and the natural numbers. Surely we can select that isomorphism as providing the "canonical" interpretation of the stroke language.
This maneuver fails. The problem is that the stroke language instantiates infinitely many different ω-sequences. Given semantics d for the stroke language, define the string-theoretic
. We can again view the stroke language as an ω-sequence, with S rather than adjunction serving as the successor operation. This new ω-sequence is once again isomorphic to the natural numbers. Thus, the mere appeal to Dedekind structure achieves nothing. It does not favor one semantics over another.
A fourth maneuver would be to treat d 1 -d 3 as privileged over all other semantic relations, on the grounds that they assign the "correct meaning" to the syntactic operation of adjunction.
Unlike most other semantic relations, d 1 -d 3 interpret adjunction as corresponding to the successor operation on the natural numbers. This interpretation may appear somehow "canonical."
A basic difficulty with the proposed maneuver is that it does not generalize beyond the simple stroke language and thus cannot provide a general criterion of "acceptable notation." A subtler but equally serious difficulty is that the proposal does not seem correct even for Turing machine syntax. Contrary to the proposal, I do not think that adjunction possesses a "canonical" It is not difficult to show that semantics d for some numerical language is computable just in case it satisfies the following condition:
The Successor Constraint: The successor function is intuitively computable relative to d.
More precisely, there exists an intuitively computable string-theoretic function φ such
A natural proposal is that we replace the Computability Constraint with the Successor Constraint.
We can then explicate the Successor Constraint through Turing's constraints (a)-(e), thereby evading circularity.
This proposal receives powerful support from the crucial role the natural numbers play in counting. Typically, we measure cardinalities by enumerating elements of some numerical notation in ascending order. This procedure only works if the successor operation is computable relative to the notation. Thus, the Successor Constraint, unlike the Translation Constraint, reflects an inherently desirable property of notations.
It would be churlish to deny that the Successor Constraint carries us much closer than our earlier efforts towards something resembling a satisfying conceptual analysis. Note, however, that the Successor Constraint is not extensionally equivalent to the Computability Constraint if we momentarily allow non-injective semantic relations. Given a non-recursive infinite set Y = {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , …} with y 0 = 0, consider the following repetitious enumeration of the natural numbers: y 0 , y 1 , y 0 +1, y 2 , y 1 +1, y 0 +2, y 3 , y 2 +1, y 1 +2, y 0 +3, etc. Let c be the semantics that maps n to the nth element of this enumeration. Then c is not computable, since otherwise the characteristic function of Y would be computable. Yet the successor operation is intuitively computable relative to c.
In case there was any doubt, this example demonstrates that the Successor and Computability Constraints are intensionally distinct, since they diverge extensionally over noninjective notations. The example also suggests that the Computability Constraint, rather than the Successor Constraint, supplies the correct criterion for an "acceptable notation." Semantics c conforms to the Successor Constraint, yet it is useless for computation, since there is no uniform mechanical procedure for interpreting numerals relative to c. Thus, a notation's suitability for performing computations stems from conformity not to the Successor Constraint but to the Computability Constraint, which entails the Successor Constraint but which is entailed by it only in the special case of injective semantic correlations. Even for that special case, the Computability Constraint, not the Successor Constraint, is explanatorily fundamental. 24 In this connection, Shapiro [20] obscure," observing that it "seems to involve the possibility of de re knowledge of particular natural numbers independent of notation" (p. 18). This complaint suggests that Shapiro finds congenial the view, discussed in §5.1, that some canonical notation mediates our thought about the natural numbers. As we saw, however, that view is quite consistent with the Computability Constraint. Moreover, even if we accept such a view, it is difficult to see why the Computability Constraint should seem any more obscure than the intuitive concept computable numbertheoretic function.
Notably, Shapiro seems to regard even this concept rather suspiciously. He writes that "strictly speaking, computability applies only to string-theoretic functions and not to numbertheoretic functions" (p. 14). Ultimately, he does introduce a notion of numerical computability: a number-theoretic function f is "computable" just in case some computable string-theoretic function computes f relative to some acceptable notation, in Shapiro's sense of "acceptable." He then proves a result that he calls "Church's thesis": a number-theoretic function f is "computable" just in case it is recursive (p. 20). The proof is easy, once we assume that all semantic correlations are injective, for in that case the Successor Constraint entails the Translation Constraint.
But does Shapiro really prove Church's thesis? It seems to me that he does not even formulate it, let alone prove it. Church's thesis concerns the pre-theoretic concept computable number-theoretic function. Shapiro does not employ this pre-theoretic concept. Instead, he employs a syntactic proxy: computable relative to a notation that satisfies the Successor Constraint. What Shapiro calls "Church's Thesis" entails Church's thesis, as it is normally understood, only when combined with the further claim that every intuitively computable number-theoretic function is computable relative a notation that satisfies the Successor Constraint. Shapiro does not attempt to establish this further claim.
We may summarize this section as follows. If you think we possess an intuitive concept of computing a number from an input, then you should reject a putative analysis of that concept based upon the Successor Constraint. If you do not think we possess an intuitive concept of computing a number from an input, or if you deny that our formal theorizing answers to any such intuitive concept, then you are of course perfectly entitled to follow Shapiro in adopting a formal ersatz based upon the Successor Constraint. In that case, you should not claim that the formal ersatz analyzes any pre-theoretic concept. Nor should you claim that your position vindicates Church's thesis, since that thesis, as it is typically understood, concerns a pre-theoretic concept. §5.3 The purely syntactic conception of computation
The conclusion of the previous section naturally leads us to inquire whether we truly possess a pre-theoretic concept of numerical computability, or at least any such concept worth preserving. We can develop a concept of numerical computation within our formal theorizing.
But, one might urge, we should not ask whether the formal concept corresponds, either extensionally or intensionally, to some intuitive notion. The only intuitive notion of computability to which our theorizing answers is string-theoretic computability. We should therefore reformulate Church's thesis so that it concerns string-theoretic, rather than numerical, computability. Let us call this approach the purely syntactic conception of computation.
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The most obvious obstacle facing the purely syntactic conception is that current mathematical practice just does seem to enshrine a notion of numerical computability. Virtually every textbook on recursion theory takes as its subject matter the computability of numbertheoretic functions. As a representative sample, see Boolos and Jeffrey [1] , Rogers [19] , and Soare [26] . Nor can we dismiss this emphasis upon number-theoretical computability as reflecting an unfortunate conflation between numerical and string-theoretic computability. For most of these same textbooks take great pains to distinguish numbers from symbols, in the context of emphasizing use-mention distinctions. There is little doubt that virtually all contemporary logicians take themselves to possess a bona fide concept computable numbertheoretic function, which they take to be co-extensive with the concept recursive function.
These observations demonstrate that the purely syntactic conception is revisionist regarding current mathematical practice and pedagogy. Its revisionism might seem relatively plausible if we also adopted a sufficiently extreme nominalist, fictionalist, or formalist conception of arithmetic, since presumably such a conception would already bar us from taking ordinary mathematical discourse at face value. However, if one is not antecedently committed to more thoroughgoing revisionism regarding arithmetic, then revisionism regarding numerical computability should seem quite unpalatable. Once we accept at face value ordinary mathematical talk about the existence of numerical functions distinct from string-theoretic functions, why should we not also accept at face value ordinary mathematical talk about our ability to compute the values of those functions? Typically, we would not hesitate to say that the multiplication algorithm taught in elementary school is a mechanical procedure for computing the product of two numbers, or that the Euclidean algorithm is a mechanical procedure for computing the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Once we accept that there exist a multiplication function and a greatest common divisor function about which we can think and reason, it seems bizarre not to say that we can, by employing the appropriate algorithms, compute the values those functions assume on given inputs. Yet to say so is to deploy an intuitive notion of numerical computability.
Another obstacle faces the purely syntactic conception. When faced with a definition of "numerical computability" as "computable relative to some notation," we naturally find it repugnant, since it allows deviant semantic relations like d X . A good philosophical account must explain this intuitive verdict. The most natural explanation is that the intuitive verdict reflects our grasp of an intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of numerical computability. The proposed definition seems "too broad," in that it classifies various functions as computable even though, by Church's thesis, they are not intuitively computable. Clearly, this explanation invokes the intuitive notion of numerical computability. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the purely syntactic conception of computation can provide a similarly satisfactory explanation. If that conception were correct, then a formal definition of "numerical computability" based upon the Computability, Translation, or Successor Constraints would apparently deserve no greater approbation than the definition "computable relative to some notation." For the formal definitions would answer to no pre-theoretic concept against which we could measure them for extensional adequacy.
Despite these obstacles, the purely syntactic conception exerts a powerful appeal. I now want to examine three arguments one might offer in its favor. Another argument for the purely syntactic conception observes that an appropriately chosen system of notation, viewed as an ω-sequence, is isomorphic to the natural numbers. One can therefore develop recursion theory over notations rather than numbers. Machtey and Young [12] do so, and the resulting theory is, in all mathematical essentials, equivalent to recursion theory as standardly developed over the natural numbers. What is lost, one might demand, by retreating in this way from numerical to syntactic computability?
The basic problem with this argument is that it provides no reason to doubt that we possess an intuitive notion of numerical computability. It merely insists that, for most or perhaps all mathematical purposes, we can settle for a syntactic surrogate. Yet, if we possess an intuitive concept of numerical computability, surely we should try to clarify its extension and intension.
We should elucidate what it is to compute a number-theoretic function, and we should specify which such functions are computable. One can dismiss these questions as uninteresting. But a brusque dismissal provides no reason for thinking the questions ill-formed or misguided, so it will hardly persuade the many philosophers and logicians who find them intrinsically interesting.
A final argument for the purely syntactic conception cites the historical motivations underlying research on computability in the 1930s. Much of that research was prompted mainly by syntactic concerns. For instance, one might argue that Turing's interest in computability stemmed most fundamentally from the decision problem for first-order logic, while Gödel sought primarily to delimit the class of formal systems. Thus, the argument goes, Church's thesis was introduced to address computations defined over symbols, not over numbers. Even if there is a legitimate notion of numerical computation, we need not concern ourselves with trying to explicate it. We can settle for syntactic computability, the only notion relevant to those problems that sparked our initial interest in Church's thesis. 26 Even if this historical analysis correctly describes the motivations of Turing and Gödel, it strikes me as rather slanted. Kleene's historical retrospective [11] Much of what Post says in the diary is extremely gnomic. However, his emphasis on the mind and mental processes strikes me as a salutary corrective to the excessive focus upon syntactic manipulation that characterizes not only Turing's exposition but most other modern discussions of computation. The syntactic approach has proved enormously fruitful. Without it, recursion theory and computer science would not exist, at least in anything resembling their current form.
Unfortunately, its amazing success has encouraged the conclusion that we can give an entirely syntactic account of computation. This conclusion strikes me as fundamentally mistaken. A general theory of numerical computability must eventually breach the circle of syntactic notions, 17 We can define the notion of formal system by invoking mechanical manipulation of syntax. Thus, Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of formal system. As Gödel puts it, "due to A. M. Turing's work a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general notion of formal system can now be given" ( [9] , p. 195). 18 I am grateful to comments from an anonymous referee that prompted the addition of this paragraph. 19 Perhaps one should not read too much into this passage. Post's diary is notable for its highly fragmentary and elusive character, sometimes bordering on the mystical. However, it seems undeniable that Post was preoccupied by what we would now call the semantic relation between symbols and numbers, as in the following passage: "… Notion of meaning bothers me. Put it as subconscious perception of things associated with symbols" (p. 428). 20 Although this is in some ways a rather crude argument for the thesis that numbers are pure abstract entities, I think that it has considerable force. Parsons provides far more subtle and sophisticated arguments for the thesis in [15] and in his unpublished manuscript Mathematical Thought and its Objects. In the unpublished Whitehead lectures "Logicism, Wittgenstein, and de re Beliefs about the Numbers," Saul Kripke flirts with the view that the numbers are individuated by their relations to syntactic-types, and he sometimes seems to accept the radical consequence that a change in notation entails a change in the numbers. 21 Kripke explores these topics in his unpublished Whitehead Lectures. See also Martin-Löf [13] and Parsons [14] . 22 For general discussion of the language of thought, see Fodor [4] . As far as I know, no one has developed the view, specifically with respect to mathematics, in very great detail. 23 In his unpublished Whitehead lectures, Kripke suggests that computability is not a sufficient condition for being an adequate canonical notation. He urges that an adequate canonical notation must satisfy some stricter constraint. Kripke mentions finite-automata-decidability. Other ideas would include primitive recursiveness or polynomial-time computability. Might such a proposal help alleviate the circularity engendered by the Computability Constraint? I doubt it. I suspect that any plausible strengthening of the Computability Constraint would still invoke the intuitive notion of computability. After all, if we demand that some notation be computable in a certain manner, or within certain limits, then we do not dispense with the intuitive concept of computability; we merely employ it in conjunction with certain additional restrictions. (Compare: when analyzing "X knows that p," it would be circular to include the clause "X believes that p based upon propositions that he knows through some especially reliable mechanism.") Still, I must admit that this seems like a somewhat promising line of response to my argument and that an adequate assessment would require much more extensive discussion. 24 What if we supplement the Successor Constraint with the demand that co-reference between numerals be mechanically decidable? This supplemented criterion is extensionally equivalent to the Computability Constraint. But is it a plausible candidate for conceptual analysis? I think we appreciate its extensional adequacy only by noting that it entails the Computability Constraint. We observe that, if a notation satisfies the Successor Constraint, and if co-reference between numerals is decidable, then there exists a mechanical procedure for interpreting the notation; we conclude that the notation is suitable for computation. 25 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this objection. 26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
